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9 September 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director

for Planning and Development

TERCUGE :

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SUBJECT

: Notes on Air Research and Development Command Long Range Planning Committee on Intelligence

1. The Air Research and Development Command Long Range Planning Committee on Intelligence was activated by Lt. Gen. Anderson in September 1957. Brig. Gen. O. J. Ritland, Vice C. G. of Ballistic Missile Division/A.R.D.C., was assigned as Chairman. The Committee's objective was to envisage the intelligence environment of the period 10-20 years hence and to make recommendations for current preparatory actions so that during the next 10 years the U.S.A.F. could properly develop pertinent scientific assets to meet the future intelligence challenge. The Committee travelled throughout the US, being briefed by major A.F. commands, to get the "feel" of the problems involved. The final technical report comprised the personal contributions of all members; all of the judgments and recommendations therein were written by the members in concert, and all were approved unanimously without reservations.

- 2. In my opinion (and memory), the key findings were that:
- a. Both the US and the USSR now had adequacy in "ultimate" weapon warheads and it was no longer critical to assess their relative lethality; rather, it was crucial to develop means to assess the Soviet plans for use, allocation (warhead-to-weapon) and deployment, time scales and intentions, in order that our defensive posture and offensive reactions reflecting timely intelligence would not allow a sudden strike against us to be made with impunity.
- b. Even covert intelligence could no longer depend essentially upon human agents alone; that there must be a conjunction of scientifically-supported humans, whole families of exotic devices including new phenomena-sensors and robot-type equipment for remote unattended operation; that there must be scientific "breakthrough" for the intelligence purpose.

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- c. Intelligence was in fact now the nation's most important weapon. In the opinion of the Committee, the nation would literally live or die, dependent upon continuous success or a one-time failure of intelligence. In the face of that sobering situation, it was found that the total annual U.S.A.F. research effort in support of intelligence was less than the cost of a single Arctic "DEWLINE" installation. In fact, the organization for scientific support of intelligence within the Air Force failed to indicate true recognition of the magnitude and scope of the problem; likewise, it failed to allow full use of its available scientific assets (with the rather lame excuse of "security").
- 3. Some important Committee recommendations were that:
- a. A General Officer be assigned to intelligence within the A.R.D.C. and that he be the focal point for all U.S.A.F. research and development in support of intelligence. (I hope they choose our Chairman, General "Ozzie" Ritland!)
 - b. Funding be made adequate and timely.
- c. Maximum use be made of proper scientific personnel within the vast A.R.D.C. complex, to fully exploit one of the nation's best "in-house" capabilities, even if it meant redesign of internal security safeguards and concepts; that successful developments were the criteria, rather than nebulous national security attained by wide-spread withholding of intelligence support to the scientists.
- ¹4. In addition to policy items, of which the foregoing is somewhat representative, an intensive technical annex was prepared; this discussed in some detail the many scientific areas currently recognized as requiring exploitation, together with the current "state of the art" in each field.

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Special Assistant Office of Scientific Intelligence

Note: General Ritland assured me last week, when I visited him in California, that Mr. Bissell would get a copy of the report and annex; only ten copies were included in the first printing and these are in high-level A.F. distribution. More will be distributed, although we will probably have the only copy outside of the U.S.A.F. (I was the only "outsider" on the Committee.)

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